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REGULATING ELECTION PROJECTIONS: A CONFLICT
OF GUARANTEES
On January 17, 1985, the three major television networks' voluntarily
agreed not to announce projected election results in any state until that
state's polls closed.2 The networks' agreement responded to congres-
sional findings that early projections discouraged voting3 and influenced
election outcomes.4 The agreement does not address problems concern-
ing voting pattern distortions in national elections created by time zone
differences5 and by the networks' reporting of state-by-state election pro-
jections.6 The shortcomings of the agreement underscore the need for a
complete ban on election projections. A direct restraint on election-day
I. The three major networks are: American Broadcasting Company ("ABC"), Columbia
Broadcasting System ("CBS") and National Broadcasting Company ("NBC").
2. Networks Won't Air Certain Election Data Until Polls Close, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1985, at 36,
col. 2. Congress suggested voluntary restraint to avoid federal regulation of the networks' election
day practices. H.R. CON. Ras. 227, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
3. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. Not only voters in early time zones-for
example, California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii and Alaska-are affected by the election projec-
tions. How the West Was Made to Feel Its Vote Would Not Count, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1980, at
A32, col. 1. Election projections also affect voters in the Eastern, Central and Mountain time zones.
Jackson, Election Night Reporting and Voter Turnout, 27 AM. J. POL. ScI. 615, 616 (1983). Broad-
casts of election projections usually begin early in the day, before polls close on the East Coast.
"Thus, potential voters throughout the country [are] possibly deterred by the election night report-
ing." Id.
4. Wall St. J., supra note 2, at 36, col. 2. For a discussion of the impact of election projections
on election outcomes, see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. See also 3 Networks to Delay
Vote Projections, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 18, 1985, at 10A, col. 2; Barron, Are Restraints
Needed on Election Day Polls? N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1984, at 15, col. 5-6.
5. Under the networks' agreement, as polls close in eastern states, election projections for
those states are reported. The time zone differential creates problems because polls in the Midwest
remain open at least one hour after poll closings on the East Coast; the West Coast polls remain open
at least two hours after the East Coast's poll closings. See generally Election Day Practices and
Election Projections: Hearings Before the Task Force on Elections of the Committee on House Admin-
istration and the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 29-30 (1981 & 1982) (listing poll
opening and closing times for each state) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Election Day Practices and
Election Projections]. The problem is compounded because an average of 25% of persons who vote
do so after 6:00 p.m.. Light, Effect of Media Projections on Pacific Coast Voting under Congressional
Study. 39 CONG. Q. WEEK REP. 1437 (1981). For a general discussion of the effect of broadcasts of
election projections on voter behavior, see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
6. Wall St. J., supra note 2, at 36, col. 2. Because the agreement allows state-by-state report-
ing of exit poll results, the final projections of the nationwide vote would be evident as soon as the
polls closed in a significant number of states. Id.
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projections until polls close everywhere in the country is necessary to
preserve the integrity of an individual's right to vote.
This Note responds to the networks' claim that early election projec-
tions are protected by the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech. Part I examines the election projection problem, its impact on
voting behavior and congressional measures adopted to resolve the prob-
lem.7 Part II discusses the Supreme Court's treatment of practices that
threaten the integrity of the election process," and the first amendment
principles that have guided the Court in sustaining regulations of such
practices.9 Part III addresses the conflict between freedom of speech and
the need to protect the election process. 10 This Note concludes that pres-
ervation of the right to vote outweighs a slight infringement on free
speech, and that Congress should enact legislation to postpone the an-
nouncement of projected election winners until all polls have closed.
I. A VIEW OF ELECTION PROJECTIONS
A. The History of the Election Projection Issue
Complaints about early election projections are not new."' In both the
1964 and 1972 presidential elections, NBC and CBS announced the pro-
jected winner shortly after polls closed in the eastern United States. 2
Fear that the early election projections influenced voting in earlier time
zones prompted the introduction of several bills in Congress.13 Early
7. See infra notes 11-40 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 76-104 and accompanying text.
11. A "projection" is an election forecast based on a sample of actual votes cast. A "predic-
tion" is a forecast based on a sample of polls or surveys. Fischer, Network "Early Calls" of Elections:
An Analysis of the Legality of Proposals to Keep the Voting Process from Becoming an Academic
Exercise, 14 Sw. U.L. Rav. 428, 429 n.6 (1984).
12. Fischer, supra note 11, at 433. In the 1964 election, NBC predicted at 3:48 p.m. EST that
presidential candidate Lyndon Johnson would receive between 60 and 70% of the popular vote.
Mendelsohn, Western Voting and Broadcasts of Results on Presidential Election Day, 30 PUn. OPIN-
ION Q. 212, 217 n.5 (1966). At 6:04 p.m. EST, CBS proclaimed Johnson as the victor. Id. at 217. In
the 1972 election, CBS and NBC again declared the victor before election polls closed nationwide.
Id.
13. Projections-Predictions of Election Results and Political Broadcasting: Hearings on S.1548,
S.1859, S.1926, S.2090 and S.2128 Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings]. The
Eighty-eighth Congress introduced four bills and the Ninetieth Congress introduced two bills: S.
CON. REs. 94 (88th Cong.) (expressing belief that news media should not, during the 1964 election,
announce computer-generated election projection results until all the polls closed), S.3115 (88th
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studies concluded that election projections had little effect on voter turn-
out,' 4 voters' candidate preference, t5  or the outcome of secondary
races. 16
The 1980 presidential election epitomizes the problem with early elec-
tion projections. On election day, November 4, 1980, at 5:00 p.m. EST,
the three major networks announced that Ronald Reagan was the prob-
able winner of the presidential election. 7 At 6:30 p.m. EST, NBC an-
Cong.) (proposing federal regulation of polling hours and prohibition on announcing election results
until all polls close), S.3118 (88th Cong.) (prescribing uniform poll closing), S.2927 (88th Cong.)
(supplementing the Communications Act to preclude the broadcast of actual or projected results, or
any opinion thereon, in any national election), S.36 (90th Cong.) (proposing uniform poll closing),
and H.R. 1423 (90th Cong.) (proscribing broadcast of certain election returns until all polls close).
14. Wolfinger & Linquiti, Tuning In and Turning Out, 45 PUB. OPINION Q. 56, 57 (1981), in a
comparison of the 1972 and 1974 elections, showed election projections caused 2.7% decline in voter
turnout. Epstein & Strom, Election Night Projections and West Coast Turnout, 9 AM. POL. Q. 479,
479 (1979), reported that voter turnout was a function of a complicated combination of factors
unrelated to election day projections, including age, place of residence (urban or suburban), income,
education, occupation, decline of political parties, the mode in which voters receive political infor-
mation (for example, neutral television news replaces partisan political message), and changes in the
electoral calendar (state and local elections are isolated from presidential race). Id. at 486-87.
Laurily Epstein was a polling consultant for NBC News at the time that she co-authored this study.
Fuchs found early election projections had a negligible effect on voter behavior. Fuchs, Election-
Day Radio, Television and Western Voting, 30 PUB. OPINION Q. 226, 231 (1966). Fuchs claimed,
however, that the 1964 election was unique. He stated that under normal circumstances, the effect
of election projections on voter turnout may be greater. Id. at 236. Mendelsohn also concluded that
premature election projections had little effect on voter turnout. Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 212.
15. Wolfinger and Linquiti state that a "bandwagon effect" may occur when voters see that
their candidate is projected to win. They claim that while these voters go to the polls, the potential
voters backing the losing candidates are likely to head for the nearest bar. Wolfinger & Linquiti,
supra note 14, at 59.
Fuchs found that in 1964 slightly more than 2.7% of voters switched their presidential candidate
preference before voting due to election day projections. Fuchs, supra note 14, at 234.
Mendelsohn claimed that political partisanship is the most influential determinate of candidate
choice. He found that a majority of voters do not consider election returns to be important to their
voting decision. To support these conclusions, Mendelsohn noted that 62% of the voters studied
during the 1964 election were not influenced by the election projections because they voted before
the early calls went on air. Mendelsohn concluded that election projections do not influence choices.
Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 219-25.
16. Only Epstein and Strom addressed this issue. They concluded that the early projections did
not effect secondary races. In 1980, two incumbent Democratic Representatives, James Corman (D.
Cal.) and Al Ullman (D. Ore.), claimed that the early projection and premature announcement of a
Reagan victory caused their defeat because voters stopped going to the polls. Epstein and Strom
counter that in Ullman's district, voter participation increased from its 1976 level. They contend
that for this reason alone, his defeat could not be blamed on premature calls. Epstein & Strom,
supra note 14, at 485, 490 n.4.
17. J. GREENFIELD, THE REAL CAMPAIGN: HOW THE MEDIA MISSED THE STORY OF THE
1980 CAMPAIGN 298 (1982).
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nounced that Reagan would win a "very substantial victory.""8 At 8:15
p.m. EST, two hours and forty-five minutes before the polls closed on the
West Coast, NBC declared Reagan the next President of the United
States. 9 Finally, at 9:45 p.m. EST, again before West Coast closings, the
networks broadcasted President Carter's concession speech. 20
Various precincts reported that voters who were standing in lines at
the polls left after hearing the networks' predictions.2" Voters who were
driving to the polls heard the election results on the radio and turned
away.22 Local television stations received thousands of phone calls criti-
cizing the projections.23 Election volunteers in California failed to ap-
18. Id. No state had closed all of its polls by 6:30 p.m. EST. HOUSE REPORT OF THE COMMIT-
TEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO
THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF EARLY PROJECTIONS OF ELECTION RESULTS BY THE NEWS MEDIA,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
19. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2. At 8:15 p.m. EST, polls were still open in approxi-
mately one-half the states, including: New York and Rhode Island on the East Coast, about one-
third of the states in the central time zone, all of the states in the Mountain and Pacific time zones,
and Alaska and Hawaii. Id. ABC and CBS followed NBC by projecting Reagan's victory at 9:52
p.m. EST and 10:32 p.m. EST. Id.
In the 1980 election, NBC was the first network to call an election on the basis of exit poll results.
Traditionally, networks project election totals in individual states on the basis of actual votes tabu-
lated in key precincts. By utilizing exit poll data, NBC called many states at the same time or
minutes after the polls closed in that state. GREENFIELD, supra note 17, at 299.
20. GREENFIELD, supra note 17, at 299. A study conducted by John Jackson of the University
of Michigan concluded that either Carter's concession or the election projections affected voter turn-
out. The two factors, however, did not have a cumulative effect on voter behavior. Jackson, supra
note 3, at 628-29.
21. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2-6 (testimony by Ray Phelps, Director of Elections in
Oregon, stating that he and many others observed people walking away from the polls without
voting) (quoting from Early Election Returns and Projections Affecting the Electoral Process: Hear-
ings Held Jointly Before the Committee on House Administration and the Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Early Election Returns]); id. at 5 (Sacramento
area coordinator for former President Carter testified that those who did vote claimed "they 'knew'
that their votes didn't count.") (quoting from Early Election Returns, supra, at 175).
22. Id. at 2 (testimony that people drove by the polling places and shouted to pollgoers, "We
heard on the radio it's been decided, why bother-...") (quoting from Early Election Returns,
supra note 21, at 175).
23. Id. at 3. A voters' service director of the League of Women Voters reported the following
account:
We have 499 registered voters in my precinct. Usually. . . after 6:30 p.m.,. .. we have a
tremendous [voter turnout]. But this time, not one voter came between 6:50 and 7:20. We
didn't have a radio and couldn't imagine what had happened. . . . Finally, a man came in
at 7:20 and told us, "it was all over." After that, only seven more people came in saying
things like, "I know I'm throwing my vote away," and "I'm only here to vote on the
propositions."
(quoting from Early Election Returns, supra note 21, at 70).
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pear, and people stopped calling voter information telephone lines.24
Candidates in close state and local races claimed that the projections dis-
couraged voting and therefore contributed to their defeat.25
Widespread criticism after the 1980 election prompted Congress to
hold hearings to determine the effects of election projections on voting
behavior.26 The hearings produced three critical findings. First, election
projections reduce voter turnout in the western states.2 7 Second, early
projections may alter the outcome of close races.28 Finally, early projec-
tions reduce voter confidence in the value of their individual vote, threat-
ening the integrity of democratic government.29
Prior to the 1984 presidential race, Congress adopted a resolution urg-
24. GREEFIELD, supra note 17, at 299-300. One witness explained that she scheduled the Dem-
ocrat's door-to-door canvassing efforts in Sacramento to begin at 3:00 p.m. By that time, television
stations had broadcast projections of Carter's defeat. Most voluntary canvassers failed to arrive.
Those who did work returned to the campaign headquarters telling stories of voter dismay and
apathy because of network projections. Early Election Returns, supra note 21, at 175.
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 3. The House Report claims that the slightest impact on
voter turnout could have affected the outcomes of several state and local elections. For example,
0.28% of the vote decided one California Assembly seat. Id. at 7. The report also cites the case of
the 21st Congressional District of California seat, "where an additional [two] per cent would have
meant 5000 votes in a race that was decided by 864 votes." Id. A seven-vote lead decided the
winner of a Montana legislature seat. Idr Also, out of more than a quarter of a million votes cast in
the race for the 17th District seat for the California state senate, a margin of 838 votes determined
the winner. Id.
Network interference with voter participation occurred in 1984 during the Iowa Democratic presi-
dential caucuses. Are Restraints Needed on Election Day Polls?, supra note 4, at 15, col. 5-6. Iowa
Democrat Party Rules prohibit caucus participants from expressing their candidate preference until
8:30 p.m. Early Election Projection. The Iowa Experience, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984) [hereinafter cited as The Iowa Experience] (statement of
Representative Timothy E. Wirth, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance). At 8:12 p.m., before thousands of Iowans had the opportunity
to select their Democratic candidate, CBS announced that Walter F. Mondale would win the Iowa
Democratic caucus. Id.
26. See generally Hearings on Election Day Practices and Election Projections, supra note 5;
Early Election Returns, supra note 21; The Iowa Experience, supra note 25.
27. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6. Congress relied heavily on individual accounts of the
events of the 1980 election to support its conclusion that election projections reduced voter turnout.
Id. at 3. 5-6. Hesitating to adopt the studies and surveys reported on the record, Congress neverthe-
less concluded "that [the studies showed] there was a significant decline [in voter turnout] due to the
early network projections." Id. at 4.
28, Id. at 7. Congress emphasized that even a possibility of network influence on election out-
comes is a serious problem. Id.
29. Id. at 7. Congress pointed to testimony by John Behnke, president and general manager of
KOMO-TV and KOMO-Radio, to summarize the message conveyed to voters in 1980 by the net-
works. Behnke, quoting an ABC commentator, stated, "Well, you folks out West might as well not
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ing the networks to withhold voluntarily election projections until after
all of the polls across the country close.3 ° Congress also requested that
the broadcasting industry restrict the use of exit polls as the basis for
election projections. 31 The networks ignored the resolution during the
1984 election, instead adopting a scheme permitting them to identify
probable winners before polls closed and to predict the outcome of the
presidential election three hours before the polls closed on the West
Coast.32 After the 1984 election, the three major networks acceded to
Congress' request for restraint on the condition that Congress investigate
a uniform poll closing time for national elections.33
B. The Effects of Election Projections on Voter Behavior
The networks argue that election projections have no meaningful effect
on voter behavior.34 Recent investigations reveal, however, that election
go to the polls because it is all decided." Id. (quoting from Early Election Returns, supra note 21, at
280).
Congress pointed to three reasons justifying its fear of improper influence on voters by the media.
First, public perception that the vote has no value is as damaging as an impact on voter turnout. A
democracy rests on individual citizens' willingness to accept the results of the electoral process. Id.
at 8. If the integrity of this process is in doubt, so is the democratic state. Id.
Second, as one witness testified, the influence of the election projections ". . . causes one to fear
that we are creeping rapidly toward the policies and tactics of the Eastern Countries-fool the peo-
pie into believing they have a choice in helping choose their officials but in fact only a handful of
influence-peddling organizations will actually make the decision." Id. (quoting from Early Election
Returns, supra note 21, at 215).
Third, the voters' perception that their vote "did not count" in 1980 may lead to cumulative
damage as voters might assume the same stance in 1984, 1988 and so on. Id. at 8 (citing Representa-
tive William M. Thomas, Early Election Returns, supra note 21, at 294).
30. H.R. CONG. RES. 227, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H11722, S11024 (1984). The
resolution does not clarify whether the networks are to refrain from reporting the projections before
the polls close in each individual state or after all polls close nationwide. One purpose of the resolu-
tion was to emphasize to the media the urgency of the election projection issue. HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 17. Congress also wanted to defer final resolution of the issue to the networks. Id.
31. The resolution specifically stated: ". . . the news media . . . should adopt guidelines to
assure that data from exit interviews are not used to project election results before the polls close."
H.R. CON. RES. 227, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (Apr. 10, 1984).
32. See Gans, TVs Election Damage, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1984, at 25, col. 1. The plan addi-
tionally allowed projections in states straddling two time zones prior to poll closings in the state's
western zone.
33. See Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1985, at 36, col. 2. But see infra notes 138-145 and accompanying
text (demonstrating the inadequacy of uniform poll closings as a solution). The networks' condi-
tional response to Congress' resolution indicates the power wielded by the major broadcasting com-
panies. See generally BOTEIN & RiCa, NETWORK TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3-34
(1980).
34. Early Election Returns, supra note 21, at 14 ("Election-night vote projections have never
been demonstrated to have any measurable effect on either voter turnout or voter choice") (state-
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projections influence voters' decisions whether to vote and for whom. In
a comparative study of the 1972 and 1974 elections, Professors Wolfinger
and Linquiti found that early election calls caused a 2.7 percent decline
in voting.35 On the West Coast alone, this decline amounted to the loss
of almost a half million votes.3 6 Professor Jackson, confirming Wolf-
inger's and Linquiti's study, posited a correlation between the voter's
perception of the need for his vote and the voter's decision whether or
not to vote, and concluded that early projections affect voter turnout
when the projections conflict with the voter's prior expectations.37
Election projections also may affect a voter's candidate preference.
Election projections may cause voters to jump on the bandwagon of an
apparent winner or side with a projected underdog.38 Sociological stud-
ies indicate that early election calls produce a "bandwagon effect," en-
couraging voters to change their vote solely on the basis of the
projection.39 More importantly, the bandwagon effect influences secon-
dary races by helping candidates in congressional, local and state elec-
tions "ride the coattails" of the projected winner of the presidential
race.' One commentator found that at least twenty percent of the popu-
lation was undecided on election day in 1964.4 t The susceptibility of vot-
ment of William J. Small, President, NBC News); L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1984, § 2, at 8, col. 1 (Gene
Mayer, Senior Vice-President of CBS News, in responding to complaints about election projections,
stated: "[W]e're on record as saying that those criticisms are unjustified"); The Iowa Experience,
supra note 25, at 122 (statement by Ralph E. Goldberg, Vice-President and Assistant to the Presi-
dent, CBS News, claiming that network projections do not have a harmful effect on the electoral
process).
35. Wolfinger & Linquiti, supra note 14, at 56. Wolfinger and Linquiti derived the 2.7% de-
cline figure from a sample of about 90,000 people, or sixty times as many used in a Gallop poll
sample.
36. Id.
37. Jackson, supra note 3, at 616, 633. For example, when election projections of an easy vic-
tory reach voters anticipating a close race, the voters stay home. Id at 632. On the other hand,
when voters expect a landslide, but projections reveal a close race, voter turnout increases. Id. Jack-
son found that overall voter turnout decreased by 6-11%. Id
38. See Note, Reporting Election Returns and Computer Predictions Proposed Regulation, 50
IOWA L. REV. 1173 (1965). But see Elections, Computers and the First Amendment, 2 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 17, 35 (1966).
The "bandwagon" or "underdog" effects defy measurement. Wolfinger & Linquiti, supra note 14,
at 57. Wolfinger and Linquiti state that evidence on these effects is difficult to derive because sample
sizes are usually too small and the temptation to rationalize voting behavior to these effects is too
great.
39. See, e.g., Note, supra note 38, at 1177 (1964 election projections affected 1% of Oregon
voters).
40. Id. at 1179.
41. 1967 Hearings, supra note 13, at 215 (statement of Prof. Warren E. Miller) (13% of voters
Number 4]
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ers to influence from election projections threatens to undermine the
integrity and meaning of the right to vote.
II. THE CONFLICTING GUARANTEES
Congress should safeguard the right to vote from the impact of elec-
tion projections on voting behavior. The television networks claim, how-
ever, that the first amendment guarantees the right to broadcast election
projections.42 A clear conflict exists between the right to vote and free-
dom of speech. The resolution of this conflict turns largely on the classi-
fication of the right to vote as a compelling governmental interest. The
following discussion analyzes the Supreme Court's efforts to preserve the
right to vote and sets forth certain principles of first amendment analysis
that would likely guide the Supreme Court in evaluating the permissibil-
ity of a ban on election projections.
A. The Right to Vote: A Compelling Interest
The right to vote is integrally related to the first amendment right of
free speech.43 As the elemental form of political expression, voting pro-
tects against government interference with other basic liberties and guar-
antees political accountability to the electorate.' Voter confidence in
this process is the source of governmental authority.45 For these reasons,
the Supreme Court characterizes the right to vote as fundamental under
the fourteenth amendment.46
To maintain voter confidence in the voting process, the Court has sus-
tained statutes that preserve the integrity of the election process, includ-
surveyed changed their candidate preference on election day). Professor Miller, however, found no
evidence that election projections influenced voter decisions. Id. at 211, 212.
42. Barron, supra note 4, at 15, col. 5-6.
43. See, eg., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (restrictions on the eligibility of
voters and candidates implicate first amendment rights).
44. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964), the Supreme Court explained: "No right is
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if
the right to vote is undermined."
45. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 302 (1888); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 8
(quoting Early Election Returns, supra note 21, at 316).
46. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). The right to vote is an implicit right under
the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal access to the electoral process. San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 101 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court
applies strict scrutiny to statutes interfering with or impairing the right to vote. Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
[Vol. 63:797
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ing statutes restricting freedom of speech. In Buckley v. Valeo,47 the
Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the Federal Elections
Campaign Act, an election campaign financing regulation. In Buckley,
the challengers asserted that various restrictions on individual campaign
contributions violated the freedoms of speech and association.48 The
government claimed that the need to protect candidates from the appear-
ance of improper influence justified the provisions.49 The Court held that
the compelling governmental interest in protecting the integrity of the
election process outweighed the incidental restraint on freedom of
speech." The Court reasoned that although contributions serve as "a
general expression of support" for a candidate and his views, the regula-
tion entailed only an indirect restriction on the contributor's ability to
engage in that expression.51
The interests underlying the need to preserve the integrity of the elec-
tion process are compelling. Even speculative interests, such as protect-
ing against the appearance of impropriety in the election process, have
justified the regulation of practices that are arguably within the protec-
tion of the first amendment.
B. "Subject-Matter" Restrictions on Speech
The first amendment prohibits Congress from making laws that
abridge the freedom of speech.52 Freedom of speech promotes intelligent
47. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
48. Id at 24.
49. Id. at 25. The Court stated that even a "significant interference" with protected first
amendment rights is constitutional if the interest is sufficiently important and the means are nar-
rowly drawn to avoid "unnecessary abridgment" of first amendment rights. Id.
50. Id. at 26-27. The Court deferred to Congress' determination that "the avoidance of the
appearance of improper influence 'is also critical. . . if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.'" Id. (quoting United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). The Court noted further
that the statute was drawn narrowly to serve this interest because it left individuals free to partici-
pate in independent political expression. 424 U.S. at 28-29; see also California Medical Ass'n v.
Federal Election Comm., 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding the Federal Elections Campaign Act
against first amendment challenge); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (employing "appearance of impropriety" rationale to sustain statute
prohibiting federal employees from participating in partisan political activities). In Brown v. Hart-
lage, 456 U.S. 45, 57-59 (1982), the Court interpreted the "appearance of impropriety" rationale of
Buckley to apply to situations of actual or possible corruption.
51. 424 U.S. at 21. The Court reasoned that it is the contribution itself by which the message of
support is symbolized and conveyed and not the amount of the campaign contribution. Id.
52. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has not
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self-government, 53 and fosters individual self-fulfillment54 and the search
for truth through the free exchange of ideas."
In evaluating the permissibility of a restraint on the freedom of speech,
the Supreme Court often distinguishes between content-neutral and con-
tent-based restrictions on speech.5 6 A content-neutral restriction serves
an interest unrelated to the message conveyed.5 7 In contrast, a content-
based restriction serves an interest directly related to the message con-
veyed. The Court is consistently hostile to content-based restrictions.5 9
distinguished between free speech and free press in developing principles governing the first amend-
ment. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
53. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
54. For an elaboration on the self-fulfillment, autonomy values underlying the first amendment,
see Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
55. Justice Holmes explained the concept of the "marketplace of ideas" in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) ("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market") (Holmes, J., dissenting).
John Milton wrote:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in
the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her
and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worst in a free and open
encounter?
MILTON, AEROPAGITICA-A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PAR-
LIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), reprinted in AEROPAGITICA AND OTHER PROSE WORKS 223-28
(1972).
56. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189
(1983).
57. The Supreme Court has validated laws that restrict speech because of the content neutrality
of the restriction. See Heffiron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-
56 (1981) (limitation on solicitation on state fairgrounds to designated areas justified by need for
crowd control); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting door-
to-door solicitations without homeowners' consent upheld); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89
(1949) (law prohibiting sound trucks that emit "loud and raucous" noise upheld); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 578 (1941) (ordinance requiring permit fee to hold a parade upheld).
58. The most common form of content-based restrictions distinguishes the application and pur-
pose of the statute from the specific information or ideas that it conveys. See, eg., Linmark Assocs.,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1977) (law banning display of "For Sale" signs
in residential community); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (zoning
ordinance requiring adult movie theatres showing nonobscene, sexually explicit films to be dispersed
throughout the city); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-18 (1973) (criminal obscenity statute);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,495-97 (1951) (law prohibiting advocacy of violent overthrow
of government).
59. Professor Stone explains that the Court relies on two reasons for its speech-protective ap-
proach to content-based restrictions:
[B]ecause such restrictions accord differential treatment to speech because of its content,
they necessarily distort the ordinary workings of the "marketplace of ideas" in a content-
differential manner. Such restrictions thus leave the public with only an incomplete - and
perhaps inaccurate - perception of their social and political universe. As a consequence,
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A restriction of speech directed at an entire subject matter, rather than
a particular idea or viewpoint, defies classification as either a content-
neutral or content-based restriction. In the past, the Supreme Court has
treated such "subject-matter" restrictions both as content-neutral and
content-based. In Police Department v. Mosley,' for example, the Court
invalidated an ordinance prohibiting all picketing, except peaceful labor
dispute picketing, within 150 feet of any school. The Court treated this
subject-matter restriction as content-based, concluding that the ordi-
nance impermissibly discriminated among types of picketing.61
On the other hand, the Court has sometimes treated subject-matter
restrictions as content-neutral, applying a lesser standard of scrutiny to
sustain the challenged restraint. Thus, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,62 the
Court concluded that federal and state statutes that prohibit public em-
ployees from engaging in partisan political activities did not violate the
first amendment.63 Noting that the statutes helped to maintain imparti-
ality in the administration of the laws, the Court concluded that the stat-
utes were content-neutral because they operated evenly and did not
involve the government in impermissible censorship." In conclusion, the
Court is less hostile toward subject-matter restrictions because they are
they tend seriously to undermine two of the principal purposes of free speech: they distort
the search for truth, and they distort the process so essential to the effective operation of a
self-governing society by which the citizen makes for himself critical decisions on matters
of public policy.
Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restric-
tions, 46 U. CHI. L. Rav. 81, 101 (1978).
60. 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972).
61. Id. at 94-96. The Court expressed concern about government censorship, indicating its
equation of subject-matter restrictions with content-based restrictions. See also Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (subject-matter restriction treated as content-based). But see
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (discussed infra notes 66-75).
One commentator points out that the Mosley Court departed from traditional constitutional anal-
ysis of content-based restrictions. Previously, the Court had focused on whether the restricted
speech was sufficiently harmful to justify government interference with the speech. In Mosley, how-
ever, the Court focused on the harm created by the distinction between labor and nonlabor picket-
ing. The Mosley Court asked "not whether there is adequate reason to restrict the speech restricted,
but whether there is adequate reason to restrict only the speech restricted." Stone, supra note 59, at
87 n.27 (emphasis added).
62. 413 U.S. 601 (1973); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (companion case to Broadrick).
63. The Court first addressed the issue of political participation by government employees in
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). In Mitchell, the Court held that the Hatch
Act's restriction of federal employees' partisan activities did not violate the first amendment because
federal employees remained free to express themselves through participation in the voting process.
Id. at 102-03. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
64. 413 U.S. at 616.
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inherently viewpoint-neutral.65
In Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,66 a plurality of the Court
emphasized the importance of viewpoint neutrality in sustaining a zoning
ordinance that required dispersing over a geographic area movie theaters
exhibiting sexually explicit films.67 A majority of the Court sustained the
ordinance despite its content orientation. The plurality interpreted the
Court's hostility against content-based restrictions as hostility against
regulations aimed at a particular viewpoint, rather than at a general sub-
68ject area.
As an alternative ground for upholding the ordinance in Young, Jus-
tice Stevens' plurality opinion articulated a lower-value-speech rationale
for upholding reasonable regulations of certain kinds of speech. 69
Although a majority of the Court has not acceded to the notion that
speech may be regulated in relation to its value,7° the Court has identified
65. A closely related alternative basis for the Court's tolerance of subject-matter restrictions is
that subject-matter restrictions often facilitate government impartiality. In United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), for example, the Court deter-
mined that the regulation of civil service employees' partisan political speech checked the infiltration
of improper influences on the administration of the law-one way to achieve impartiality. Similarly,
in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), the Supreme Court characterized a restraint on political
activities on military bases as a means to maintain a neutral military.
The Court has upheld viewpoint-neutral subject-matter restrictions in several other cases. In
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), for example, the Court upheld a
statute that permitted individuals to stop the delivery of mail containing sexually provocative adver-
tising. Id. at 738. The Court reasoned that the element of individual discretion prevented the gov-
ernment from arbitrarily discriminating between types of sexually related speech. Id. at 737; see also
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) (upholding a subject-matter restric-
tion prohibiting political advertising in public transit cars because the regulation applied evenhand-
edly to all political advertising).
66. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
67. Id. at 52. Detroit passed the ordinance to mitigate the deleterious effects of adult theatres
on the quality of urban dwelling.
A "viewpoint-neutral" statute is one that differentiates treatment on grounds other than viewpoint
or opinion. The concept was first articulated by Justice Black in NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 720,
377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). The concept of "content neutrality" evolved from
Justice Black's original articulation of viewpoint neutrality. See generally Note, Constitutional Law
- First Amendment - Content Neutrality, 28 CASE W. RES. 456 (1978). The Court eventually
treated the two concepts quite differently. Compare Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972), with Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
68. 427 U.S. at 66-71. Justice Stevens explained that the rationale for the rule proscribing
content-based speech restrictions was the need for "absolute neutrality by the government; its regula-
tion of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being
expressed by the communicator." Id. at 70.
69. Id.
70. But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech
occupies a subordinate position in the scale of first amendment values).
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several categories of speech that have such low value that they are enti-
tled to less protection under the first amendment. 71 These categories in-
clude: incitement to violence, libel, obscenity, fighting words, and, most
recently, commercial speech.72 In determining whether a particular cate-
gory of speech occupies a subordinate position in the scale of first amend-
ment values, the Court has focused on the extent to which the speech
furthers the historical, political and philosophical underpinnings of the
first amendment.73 Although the categories of speech entitled to less
protection have been treated as a closed class, decisions such as Young
indicate the Court's increasing recognition of the need to evaluate some
speech in relation to the core values underlying the first amendment free-
dom of speech. 74 Thus, in Young, the plurality concluded that sexually
related movies rank low on the hierarchy of protected speech and are
therefore subject to reasonable regulation.75
III. REGULATION OF ELECTION PROJECTIONS: BALANCING THE
CONFLICTING INTERESTS
A ban on the announcement of election projections until polls close
everywhere in the country constitutes a subject-matter restraint of
speech. As the discussion in Part II reveals, the Supreme Court has
failed to articulate a comprehensive standard delineating the scope of
permissible subject-matter restrictions.76 In some cases the Supreme
Court has exhibited considerably less hostility to subject-matter restric-
tions of speech that advance important governmental interests, evaluat-
ing these restrictions as content-neutral.77 In other cases, the Court has
treated subject-matter restrictions as content-based, requiring the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the regulation serves a compelling interest and
that its provisions are narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of the regula-
71. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth .... ).
72. See Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 280-81 (1981).
73. Id.
74. See VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT(1985); see also Stone,
supra note 59, at 194-95.
75. Justice Stevens maintained that because "few of us would march our sons or daughters off
to war to preserve the citizen's right to see [adult films], it is manifest that society's interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in
untrammeled political debate." 427 U.S. at 70.
76. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text; see also Stone, supra note 59, at 82 n.6.
77. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing Broadrick and Greer).
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tion.78 The following discussion evaluates the permissibility of a ban on
election projections under each approach.
A. Deferential Review of a Ban on Election Projections: A Subject-
Matter Restriction on Low Value Speech
The proposed ban on election projections is inherently viewpoint-neu-
tral. 79 Thus, the interests served by the ban are unrelated to any particu-
lar viewpoint or idea expressed by the early projection of election results.
A ban on election projections creates no danger of governmental censor-
ship of speech merely because of disagreement with the message con-
veyed by the projection.
Subject-matter restrictions of speech are permissible when certain gov-
ernment interests are at stake. The interests advanced by a ban on elec-
tion projections are substantially similar to the interests advanced in
Broadrick and Greer. 0 In particular, an election projection ban pre-
serves the integrity of the election process by avoiding the exertion of
improper influences on voting behavior."1 The interest in protecting
against government partiality, an interest frequently articulated by the
Supreme Court in sustaining subject-matter restrictions of speech, is im-
plicated by the election projection ban because the integrity of the voting
process is the ultimate check on the exercise of government power in a
democratic society. 2 Consequently, the Supreme Court should not tol-
erate any practices that undermine the election process or voter confi-
dence in that process.
Finally, a ban on election projections is a subject-matter restriction of
arguably low value speech.8 3 Thus, the proposed election projection reg-
78. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing Mosley).
79. For a discussion of viewpoint neutrality, see supra note 67. A ban on election projections is
inherently viewpoint neutral because the ban does not entail the suppression of any viewpoints. In
other words, an election projection is merely factual information rather than a distinct idea. Argua-
bly, the networks generate election projections to predict the general viewpoint of the electorate. See
Early Election Returns, supra note 21, at 230 (statement of CBS News' President Bill Leonard).
However, a restriction on election projections would only suppress speech impermissibly after this
viewpoint is articulated through the voting process. The temporary nature of the restraint - until
all polls close - avoids this result.
80. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
81. See also supra note 50 (discussing Buckley and the important interest in avoiding the ap-
pearance of impropriety in the election process).
82. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.




ulation is similar to the regulation sustained in Young.8 4 First, the pro-
posed ban on election projections is inherently viewpoint-neutral.
Second, election projections constitute speech of low first amendment
value.8 5 An election projection does not convey a particular idea; it
merely conveys factual information. The networks' interest in broadcast-
ing election projections is clearly economic. The value of the information
to the recipient is less clear.86 Regardless of the precise value of the
speech involved in election projections, the speech restrained in, for ex-
ample, Broadrick or Greer was more centrally located in relation to the
core values underlying freedom of speech.87 Moreover, a ban on election
projections prior to the closing of all polls could never have the effect of
suppressing particular ideas. The regulations sustained in Broadrick and
Greer, although viewpoint-neutral, effectively prohibited the expression
of political viewpoints and ideas.88 A fortiori, a subject-matter restric-
tion of speech that is unrelated to any viewpoint is less objectionable.
The Supreme Court should sustain a ban on election projections until
all polls close on the grounds that the regulation is a subject-matter re-
striction of speech that furthers important government interests underly-
ing the election process. Moreover, election projections constitute speech
of low first amendment value because such projections convey informa-
tion, not ideas.
B. Strict Scrutiny of a Ban on Election Projections
Some commentators argue that subject-matter restrictions of speech
should nevertheless be analyzed under stringent speech-protective stan-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. One commentator argues that the only value of election projections is economic - the
networks' race to be first with election calls in order to attract more viewers and advertisers. See
Barron, supra note 4, at 15. Another commentator argues that projections and predictions of elec-
tion outcomes have informational value, serving to inform and educate the voter in the same fashion
as a news report. Fischer, supra note 11, at 450-51. He states that potential voters use the informa-
tion to decide whether or not to vote in a particular election. Id. This argument, however, only
highlights the negative influence that election projections have on voting behavior and election
results.
87. The speech suppressed in Broadrick and Greer was pure political speech. See supra notes
62-65 and accompanying text.
88. In Greer, for example, the Court sustained a ban on political speech on military bases.
Although the regulation was characterized as viewpoint neutral, the effect of the ban was to suppress
the expression of all viewpoints, albeit in an evenhanded manner. Election projections, on the other
hand, do not involve the expression of a viewpoint. See supra note 79.
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dards.89 However, even if courts analyze subject-matter restrictions of
speech under traditional standards for content-based restrictions,9" the
regulation of election projections would survive such strict scrutiny. The
following discussion asserts that the interests threatened by election pro-
jections are compelling interests and that a ban on election projections
until all polls close represents the least restrictive means of protecting
those interests.91
1. The Compelling Interests
A temporary ban on election projections, that is, a ban until all polls
close, requires the government to show that the ban protects and pro-
motes a compelling interest. In 1984, Congress articulated its interest in
preserving the integrity of the election process by adopting a resolution
requesting the networks to withhold voluntarily election projections. 92
The Supreme Court has previously defined the interests underlying the
right to vote as compelling.93 Congressional investigation revealed that
election projections impinge upon these compelling interests in several
ways.
Election projections often constructively disenfranchise the voter.
Although the projections do not directly impede the voting right, Con-
gress found that the early projections left voters with the impression that
their vote did not count.94 Congress concluded that this perception of
voter incompetency divests citizens of the incentive to vote.95 In addi-
tion, the integrity of the electoral process is threatened by the appearance
of network influence on voter participation and, subsequently, on the
outcome of particular races.96
A temporary ban on election projections has only a slight effect on free
speech. For example, the Court emphasized that although a ceiling on
campaign contributions impaired "political communication," it in no
way constrained the donor's free speech interest in political debate.97
89. See Stone, supra note 59, at 82.
90. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
91. The Court often looks to the least restrictive alternative test when examining the regulation
of individual liberties to ensure proper legislative motives. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
94. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.




Similarly, a ban on election projections would not restrain the networks'
freedom to discuss candidates, issues, or voter interviews.
2. The Least Restrictive Alternative
The final step in analyzing the permissibility of the proposed restric-
tion on election projections entails application of a two-part test enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court. First, the government must show that the
ban is narrowly drawn to achieve the desired ends.9" Next, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that no less restrictive alternatives are available
to achieve the goals of the ban.9 9
Congress has three possible approaches to resolving the election pro-
jection issue. First, Congress could do nothing and rely on the networks
to refrain voluntarily from making early projections. Second, Congress
could enact a uniform poll closing law. Third, Congress could ban elec-
tion projections until all polls closed. Voluntary restraint does not work
because the networks are not bound to exercise restraint. Furthermore,
as the last presidential election demonstrated, the networks are not will-
ing to exercise any self-restraint."° For several reasons, a uniform poll
closing law also would not solve the problem. This approach presumes
that the networks cannot make projections without first obtaining the
actual vote count from closed polls. However, networks often use exit
polling to make very reliable predictions.1"1 In addition, the uniform
poll closing plan would exclude Alaska and Hawaii.1"2 Finally, this ap-
proach would require altering long-established voting habits to accom-
modate the networks. 03 The drastic change required to implement this
98. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981).
99. See, eg., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1962).
100. Moreover, the conditional nature of the networks' 1985 agreement makes it unclear
whether the networks will revert to early projections if Congress rejects uniform closings of polls.
Wall St. J., supra note 2, at 36, col.2. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
101. See Note, Exit Polls and the First Amendment, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1927 (1985).
102. See, ag., H.R. 1813, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (bill proposing uniform poll closing time
of 8 p.m. E.S.T., excludes polls located in the Yukon, Alaska, Hawaii or Bering time zones). Con-
gress has authority to determine the time at which Presidential electors are chosen. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 3. Although Congress has used this power to set the national election date, it has left the
times for poll openings and closings up to the states, which have traditionally set the details of the
election day process. Fischer, supra note 11, at 441-42.
103. Wolfinger & Linquiti, supra note 14, at 59. Closing the polls at the same time across the
country is supposed to restrict the availability of returns from sample precincts used by the networks
to make the projections. Returns across the nation would be unavailable until all polls closed across
the country, depriving networks of data necessary to make projections. Id.
Proposed solutions stemming from the uniform poll closing alternative include: establish two-day
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approach could be expensive and costly in terms of voter participation. 10 4
A ban on election projections until all polls close is the only practical
way to protect the integrity of the electoral process from the inimical
effects of election projections.'05 A ban would require neither citizens to
change voting habits nor states to make expenditures to accommodate
the networks. Also, the ban protects the right to vote, regardless of time
zone differences, and protects the electoral process from the influences of
the broadcast media. Finally, the proposed ban would apply only until
the polls have closed, leaving the networks free to project probable win-
ners after everyone has exercised their right to vote.
IV. CONCLUSION
The election projections issue presents many challenges to the nation's
lawmakers. Any attempt to regulate projections necessarily implicates
the networks' first amendment rights. Balanced against these rights,
however, is the right to vote, the ultimate form of expression in a free
society. Unrestricted election projections threaten the meaning of this
right. Congress should exercise its authority to regulate election projec-
tions to preserve the right to vote. 106
Meribeth Richardt
voting (requiring western states to begin voting the Monday evening before Election Day Tuesday);
hold elections on Sunday (to increase voter participation); make Election Day a holiday (to increase
voter participation); extend daylight savings time in the western states for two extra weeks (thereby
reducing the time zone differential to one hour). Congress found these solutions ineffective because
many of them do not consider the reliable predictions available from exit polls. Also, all of the
proposed solutions fail to take into account the time zone differences in Hawaii and Alaska. See also
Comment, Restricting the Broadcast of Election-Day Projections: A Justifiable Protection of the Right
to Vote, 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 297, 312 (1984).
104. See Wall St. J., supra note 2, at 36, col.2. For example, to compensate for the time differen-
tial between the East and West Coasts, uniform poll closing would require late poll closings in the
east and early poll openings in the west.
105. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 442; Wall St. J., supra note 2, at 36, col. 2.
106. Canada directly regulates election projections. Kushner, Election Polls, Freedom of Speech
and the Constitution, 15 OTTAWA L. REV. 515 (1983). Although the states ordinarily regulate the
election process, the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate federal elections as well. In
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), the Supreme Court construed Congress' power to include
regulation of "the making and publication of election returns." Id. at 366.
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